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The international mobility of capital and the geographical dispersion of firms have 
clear advantages for the growth and modernisation of the region. They also create 
fundamental challenges for national tax authorities. Modern principles of capital 
taxation for the open developing economy indicate the need to find the correct 
balance between the encouragement of private investment and the finance of social 
infrastructure, both of which are necessary for sustainable growth. This balance can 
be sub-optimal where countries compete for inward investment by granting tax 
incentives or exercise conflicting principles in determining the tax base. The current 
practice of international taxation indicates that fiscal authorities in Latin America 
and the Caribbean could attain a more equitable share of capital tax revenue without 
depressing investment and growth.  This might be achieved through more effective 
regional tax rules, double taxation treaties, information sharing and treatment of 
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Introduction 
Globalisation involves increasing freedom of capital movement: both for firms from 
industrialised countries investing in developing countries, and for financial asset 
owners in developing countries themselves.  Standard principles of international 
taxation suggest that the tax burden should fall most heavily on those factors of 
production which are least mobile, in order to maximise government income and 
minimise the disincentives to economic growth.  There has been a corresponding shift 
in the incidence of taxation from capital to labour as governments have tried to 
maintain levels of both fiscal revenue and private investment. In the major Latin 
American economies, the estimated tax burden on the income of foreign investors has 
fallen by about a half over the past two decades.  
 
Free movement of capital and opportunities for the geographical dispersion of firms 
thus create fundamental challenges for tax authorities. Different national taxation 
norms and interstices between tax administrations create conflicts of interest among 
all involved. On the one hand, international double taxation arising from the 
concurrent exercise by two or more countries of their taxation rights is not conducive 
to business agreements in general and investment in particular.  On the other hand, 
lack of administrative co-ordination between tax jurisdictions supports capital flight 
and loss of vital tax revenue. OECD member governments have thus strengthened 
measures to prevent ‘harmful tax competition’ in recent years. However, this is a 
problem for developing as well as developed countries. Latin America and the 
Caribbean have been at the forefront of the liberalisation of capital movements, but 
are also chronically burdened by fiscal deficits, external debt and inadequate 
infrastructure.  
 
Current international taxation arrangements pose particular problems for three main 
reasons: first, the difficulties in acquiring the potential fiscal resources generated by 
both foreign and domestic trans-border firms; second, the economic costs of tax 
competition between developing countries in order to attract foreign investment; and 
third, the consequences of the inability to tax residents’ overseas assets for capital 
flight and social equity.  Despite these problems, tax payments by foreign investors 
represent a major source of fiscal resources for the region: some US$ 15 billions in 
income tax appears to have been paid by foreign firms in 2000, while tax due on 
income from residents’ overseas portfolio holdings might well be of a similar 
magnitude. At the very least international taxation arrangements should be seen as a 
vital dimension of international development policy, just as investment and trade rules 
have become.  
 
The institutional framework in international tax cooperation – tax competition, 
conflicting principles for determining the tax base, and double taxation treaties - are 
outlined in Section 2 below. Section 3 then addresses the economic principles that 
underpin policy discussions of the dilemma for an open economy that needs to both 
encourage private investment and finance social infrastructure.  Section 4 looks at 
international taxation in practice, both the statistical evidence on flows and the current 
progress on information sharing and supervision of offshore financial centres. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of a possible agenda for regional policy debate in 
Section 5. 
 





2. The Institutional Framework for International Tax Cooperation 
Capital mobility has transformed national tax policy. Present national tax systems 
were designed in a post-WWII environment of trade protection, capital and labour 
immobility when very different rates of direct and indirect tax were feasible – but this 
is no longer the case  (Tanzi 1996a, 1998). Moreover, it is often argued that in a 
closed economy corporate income taxes are inefficient as they encourage the 
excessive reinvestment of profits, and that personal income taxation on dividends (and 
capital gains) recipients is sufficient. Further, if savings are to be stimulated, it is 
often suggested that consumption only should be taxed. Whatever their conceptual 
validity, these arguments are not directly applicable in practice to small industrial or 
developing countries (OECD, 2001). On the one hand, there is a severe income 
distribution problem that requires redistribution of wealth (and thus capital taxes) in 
order to reduce poverty and increase social cohesion. On the other, much of the most 
productive assets in the economy belong to non-residents, while much of residents’ 
wealth is held abroad. So capital income taxation cannot be ignored as a central 
development policy issue.   
 
However, in the absence of a single world government a key issue in international 
taxation is the appropriate level of the domestic corporation tax rate in the face of 
integration to international capital markets. It is widely believed by policymakers that 
lower rates are essential in order to attract foreign investment and thus raise the rate of 
economic growth. The role of the tax factor in determining location gives rise to 
wasteful tax competition for investment (OECD, 1998). This has led to a ‘race to the 
bottom’ as developing countries compete with other host countries and with declining 
corporation tax rates in the home countries (UNCTAD, 1995).  
 
Most countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region – as other developing 
economies - attempt to attract foreign investment through tax incentive policies in an 
attempt to compensate for local distortions and inefficiencies, or to simply prevent 
foreign investment from going to neighbouring or similar countries. However, the 
empirical evidence suggests that such incentives play a very limited role as 
determinants of foreign investment; and even where successful, involve significant 
fiscal costs.
1 In consequence, both the OECD and the EU have recently adopted non-
binding instruments for dealing with potentially harmful preferential tax regimes, and 
it is recognized that the association of non-OECD countries with these is important. 
 
Reducing regulatory uncertainty is just as important to investing firms as the 
particular concessions or incentives that a treaty may contain.  Tax incentives appear 
to be regarded by multinational firms as a ‘windfall gain’, and not the basis for long-
term investment decisions as they may be subsequently reversed. This does not stop 
investors negotiating for such concessions, but at most they may affect location 
decisions within a country when other cost factors are unchanged. 
 
There are two models used in the design of taxes on non-residents’ assets and 
residents’ assets abroad, which are similar in their general provisions but have very 
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different implications for developing countries. The OECD Draft Taxation 
Convention/ Model Tax Conventions (OECD, 1997) is based on residence taxation; 
while the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed 
and Developing Countries (UN 1980, 2000), which is based on source (or ‘territorial’) 
taxation. Developing countries would benefit most from a multilateral tax treaty based 
on the source principle for two reasons.  First, the gains from taxing income of foreign 
investors would be greater than the loss from not taxing income from their own 
residents’ assets held abroad, because a developing country has a net external liability 
position. Second, even the full taxation of these assets held abroad by residents of 
developing countries the authorities in the destination country on the source principle 
would at least make capital flight much less attractive. 
 
The source principle is often also adopted because tax administrators have great 
difficulty in finding out how much foreign income accrues to their residents. The 
residence principle, although based on overall capacity to pay, has proved to be of 
limited significance in countries whose residents do not have substantial (recorded) 
investments in other countries, and whose fiscal administration is not well equipped to 
ensure its application. Moreover, to the extent that developed countries apply both the 
source and residence principles to their own residents, they claw back tax from their 
own investors in developing countries; while by not taxing non-residents’ security 
holdings they stimulate capital flight from developing countries. For example, the 
United States taxes both the foreign income of US residents and the US-source 
‘earned’ income of non-residents.
2 Moreover, it does not normally give full credit 
against US tax liabilities for foreign tax payments. 
 
For developing countries a further issue is how to balance between maximising their 
share of revenues and maintaining a climate that attracts FDI. This involves 
agreements on: the sharing of revenues between host and home countries in what is 
almost a ‘zero sum game’ that implies a net transfer between the taxpayers of home 
and host countries in the last instance. By adopting a tax treaty, a host country also 
subscribes to international rules that promote stability, transparency and certainty of 
treatment.  
 
Since the tax systems of the major home (i.e. OECD) countries are based on 
worldwide income taxation principles, their multinational companies are frequently 
subject to some degree of double taxation. This fact not only deters international 
investment, but also provides incentives for the use of tax havens to channel cross-
border capital flows through the incorporation of offshore holding companies. The use 
of these schemes is detrimental to both the home and host country through reduced 
tax revenues and distorted investment inflows.  
 
The number of double taxation agreements (DTTs) has thus increased rapidly in 
recent decades, and there are now some two thousand such treaties in existence, as 
Table 1 below indicates.  The principle of non-discrimination (i.e. national treatment) 
has been intrinsic to such treaties since the last century; and was central to the draft 
tax convention prepared by the League of Nations in 1935 (IBFD, 1998).  DTTs were 
originally established between developed countries, but the recent expansion, is both 
with and between developing countries: 34 percent between developed and 
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developing countries, and a further 17 percent between developing countries.  They 
clearly follow the course of the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) that establish 
corresponding investor protection disciplines. 
 
Double Taxation Treaties and Bilateral Investment Treaties 
  1980  1990  2000 
DDTs  700  1150  2118 
BITs  200  400  1941 
Source: UNCTAD (2001)   
 
The effect of tax treaties depends on the credits and exemptions included in them in 
order to eliminate or reduce double taxation. When countries are at a similar level of 
development (and there is roughly balanced two-way investment) the implicit 
redistribution is not a serious problem, but for host (developing) countries the 
marginal revenue is of greater value than to the home (developed) country. As the 
flow of income is generally from developing to developed countries, the tax credit 
method is the most attractive to developing countries.  From the point of view of 
developing country revenue authorities, DTTs are the only way to cover intra-firm 
transactions and thus overcome the problem of transfer pricing (OECD, 1997).  
These treaties, however, become ineffective if offshore centres are used as transfer 
pricing points as well as for tax avoidance.  Moreover, a number of developing 
countries play a key ‘offshore’ role in the international investment process where tax 
avoidance is of particular importance. The object here is not so much to attract foreign 
investment as such, but rather the administration of assets and tax revenue.
3  In 
consequence, short of a comprehensive multilateral tax agreement, reconsideration of 
tax credits within existing DTTs would be desirable; as would the application of the 
US ‘pass-through’ principle to tax havens. 
 
Finally it should not be forgotten that for developing countries capturing tax revenue 
on the income of their own residents who have assets overseas is a major problem too. 
In consequence, closer international collaboration, even within the existing DTT 
network, by sharing information and permitting joint actions could increase the fiscal 
resources available to developing countries dramatically (OECD, 1998; Tanzi, 
1996a). Further benefits would include disincentives to capital flight and increased 





3. The Economic Principles of Capital Income Taxation and Tax Co-ordination 
The traditional view of capital income taxation in open economies
4 is that residence-
based taxes reduce the after-tax return on domestic savings by driving a wedge 
between the rate of return on world financial markets and the after-tax rate of return 
that received by residents – in other words, a tax on the ownership of capital or 
‘savings’. In contrast, source-based taxes raise the required rate of return on domestic 
investment above the rate of return on world financial markets, and thus amount to 
                                                 
3  “We thus observe a process that, at times, has been described as ‘tax degradation’, whereby some 
countries change their tax systems to raid the world tax base and export their tax burden.” (Tanzi 
1996b: 3).  
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taxes on the location of capital – that is on investment. In consequence, the traditional 
literature suggests that a small open economy should not apply any source-based 
capital income taxation at all, adopting only residence-based systems.  
 
Universal application of the residence principle will equalise the gross rate of return 
on capital and thus allocate world capital (but not savings) efficiently; while universal 
application of the source principle will allocate world savings (but not capital) 
efficiently by equalising intertemporal marginal rates of substitution. Optimal tax 
theory has thus held that even in a second-best world (where Pareto efficiency cannot 
be attained because of the need to raise taxes for public goods and redistributive aims) 
the residence principle is preferable because it at least ensures production efficiency 
(Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971).    
 
Residence based taxation is also held to be preferable as it allows progressive rates to 
be applied for equity reasons. However, if these residence-based taxes cannot be 
collected effectively (due to lack of fiscal information, administrative capacity 
international cooperation) then capital income taxes as a whole become undesirable. 
In sum, the traditional result from the optimal tax literature is thus “that small open 
economies should adopt no source-based taxes and that capital income taxes should 
be eliminated altogether if countries cannot enforce residence-based taxes” 
(Bovenberg, 1994:118). 
 
This result is based on four assumptions: (i) that capital is perfectly mobile; (ii) that 
government can freely tax immobile factors of production - labour in particular; (iii) 
that there is no tax offset in the home country for capital tax paid in the host country; 
and (iv) the government can effectively tax income on residents’ overseas assets. In 
consequence, it is argued that source-based taxation is completely shifted onto 
immobile factors (including labour) as the perfect international capital mobility means 
that the supply of capital is infinitely elastic, so an explicit labour tax is more 
effective.  
 
Poorer countries have been under greater pressure to reduce their rates of taxation of 
affiliates of foreign multinationals than have richer countries. The implication is that – 
at least for the purposes of foreign direct investment – tax competition affects the 
poorest countries most, and disproportionately so. Haufler and Wooton (1999) show 
how tax competition even between industrialised countries for foreign direct 
investment can lead to resource and location rents being expropriated by multinational 
firms.  This justifies the OECD and EU measures taken to prevent such harmful 
competition between their respective members. The same argument holds a fortiori 
for developing countries.    
 
However, the assumptions listed above do not obtain in practice. Capital is not 
perfectly mobile internationally, being attracted by particular developing economies 
due to their market size, resource endowments or human capital; so capital income 
taxes are not entirely shifted away from investors – foreign or domestic. Governments 
cannot tax immobile factors (such as labour) freely for equity reasons and also 
because the traditional model assumes that labour supply is exogenous. If wage levels 
affect labour supply or labour productivity then there is a clear trade-off with capital 
market distortions, as Sen and Turnovsky (1990) demonstrate.  
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As we have seen, international tax credit systems do exist, and double taxation treaties 
are designed in effect to provide a direct transfer between fiscal authorities and thus 
not affect investment decisions (Frenkel et al, 1991). In consequence, countries resort 
in practice to source-based capital income taxes in the face of feasibility constraints, 
which explains why the results obtained from the theory of optimal taxation have not 
been applied in practice (Slemrod, 1990). Finally, of course there is considerable 
capacity for better coordination between fiscal and financial authorities worldwide. 
 
Moreover, within a rigorous dynamic model designed to include these 
macroeconomic effects, Bovenberg (1994) shows that governments can neutralise the 
effect of the source-based tax on investment behaviour by allowing firms to expense 
their new investment spending against their capital income tax liability; thus 
converting the tax to one on cash flow only. The intergenerational impact of 
residence-based taxation can similarly be neutralised by a tax deduction for new 
saving. In addition the intergenerational impact of both tax forms can be countered by 
an appropriate public debt policy.  
 
Capital income taxes also discriminate between different forms of financing (e.g. 
portfolio versus direct investment) so that different combinations of taxes on 
dividends, interest income, or capital gains can be used in addition to corporate taxes 
(which amount to source based taxes on equity income) to achieve the desired balance 
(Nielsen and Sørensen, 1991). This approach assumes that the capital stock is 
domestically owned. If it is foreign-owned, the burden of a source-based tax is borne 
by foreigners (who would not of course be affected by a residence-based tax) but the 
impact on capital mobility depends on both the cost of adjustment and any tax credit 
offset in the home economy (Sørensen, 1990). 
 
International tax arbitrage does none the less set severe constraints on the ability of an 
individual fiscal authority to set tax rates on capital income (and commodities).  
International tax competition takes place between countries, explicitly or implicitly, 
when capital is free to move between them. When capital markets clear, even if any 
two countries do not explicitly coordinate their tax systems between them, each 
nevertheless must take into account the tax system of the other in designing its own 
tax system. As Razin and Sadka (1994) demonstrate, when both countries adopt one 
of the polar principles (source-based or residence-based) then international capital 
markets will reach an equilibrium at positive tax and interest rates; but if they adopt 
different principles (or mixtures thereof) a viable equilibrium may not exist. However, 
if capital markets are integrated and tax systems are not harmonised then tax 
competition will emerge.  
 
If both countries are price-takers (that is ‘small’ in relation to the world economy) 
then this competition leads to an equalisation of the marginal productivity of 
investment across countries (i.e. the residence principle). No further gains can be 
made from tax harmonisation and inter-governmental coordination is not necessary. 
None the less, some countries (e.g. the US) or groups of countries (e.g. the EU) are in 
fact ‘large’ in the sense that they can design their fiscal policies with a view to their 
effects on world prices. The country with some monopoly power will in effect drive 
the world interest rate above its own marginal product of capital if it is a net investor 
overseas. In this case, international fiscal coordination will be a Pareto improvement 
(Dixit, 1985). However, the existence of a regional arrangement (such as the EU) QEH Working Paper – QEHWPS79    Page 8 
 
allows for gains from coordination within the region permitting both greater revenues 
and greater inward investment, even without global coordination (Haufler and 
Wooton, 2001). This latter case would appear to be relevant to developing country 
regions such as Latin America or the Caribbean. 
 
None the less, it is also clear (and reflected in modern endogenous growth theories) 
that the provision of ‘infrastructure’ – in the form not only of roads but also of 
education, health, research and even law – is also essential to growth. Some form of 
taxation must finance this infrastructure, but there are social limits to the extent to 
which this can be raised from labour incomes in societies with low levels of per capita 
incomes. There thus emerges a potential trade-off between low corporation tax rates 
to stimulate private investment (both domestic and foreign) on the one hand, and high 
rates in order to finance infrastructure provision on the other. It is not clear, therefore, 
that the lowest tax rates are necessarily the most conducive to growth.   
 
The ‘new economic geography’ gives sound analytical reasons to believe that capital 
is not entirely mobile (i.e. indifferent to location) due to agglomeration economies etc, 
so tax potential is affected too. Rather than a simple ‘race to the bottom’, advanced 
‘core’ economies may be able to act as semi-monopolists in fixing ‘prices’ (i.e. taxes) 
against the less advanced ‘periphery’; but integration may not lead to falling tax rates 
and may be consistent with the maintenance of large welfare states (Baldwin and 
Krugman, 2000). This result is extended formally by Kind et al (1999) who find the 
positive source tax required to be levied on capital in order to capture the positive 
externality that arises from agglomeration. The existence of trade costs and scale 
economies mean that investors are attracted by larger markets, which then require less 
tax incentives to attract investment than otherwise (Haufler and Wooton, 1999). 
Finally, these taxes on semi-mobile capital can be used to produce a public good and 
relieve the tax pressure on immobile workers (Andersson and Forslid, 1999). 
 
Appendix B examines the analytics of this problem in the framework of a simple 
model of an economy with an open capital market and two types of capital. If there is 
only one type of capital – mobile and private – then the model reproduces the 
conventional result that any increase in the domestic corporation tax rate will reduce 
national income. The optimal tax rate is zero, or even negative (subsidies) if these can 
be financed from taxes on another immobile factor such as labour. In addition, it is 
clear that if the international corporation tax rate is reduced, or that of competitors for 
inward investment, then in order to maintain national income levels it will be 
necessary to reduce the domestic corporation tax rate as well.  However, once a 
second type of capital – social infrastructure – is introduced a positive corporation tax 
rate is optimal because although it reduces the private capital stock as before, it also 
raises the public stock. The optimum value of the tax rate depends on the marginal 
productivity of the two forms of capital.  
 
The policy implications are considerable. On the one hand, in developing countries 
where infrastructure is relatively scarce, and thus its marginal productivity is higher 
(while the marginal productivity of mobile capital is being equalised worldwide) there 
is a sound economic argument for corporate tax rates being higher than in advanced 
countries.  In effect, host countries should set their optimal tax rate independently of 
the international rate. On the other hand, it is also the case that the resulting level of 
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home countries – or competing host countries – then national income will fall. 
However – and even more significantly – the model shows that even under these 
circumstances, to chase the corporation tax rate downwards will reduce national 
income even more.  
 
In sum there are sound reasons well grounded in economic theory to believe that 
capital income taxation is justified and that a residence-based tax system would be 
best for the world as a whole, so long as it were based on inter-governmental 
coordination of both rates and enforcement. In the absence of such coordination, 
source-based capital income taxes are a second-best solution for developing countries 
in particular, and their distorting effects on investment can be ameliorated by 







4. The International Taxation Problem in Practice  
In practice the taxation of international assets relates to residents and non-residents 
on the one hand, and affiliate firms and portfolio assets on the other. The main 
focus of interest is in fact the taxation of foreign affiliates- that is, ‘inward FDI’. In 
the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, the inward FDI stock as of 2000 was 
valued at US$ 607 billion (UNCTAD, 2001). On the assumption that the recorded 
income tax payments by US affiliates (see below) are representative of all foreign 
investment in the region, then the total income tax paid in this category to host 
countries was approximately US$ 15 billion in 2000.   In that year, the stock of 
outward FDI from the Latin America and the Caribbean (that is, of affiliates 
abroad) was valued at US$ 111 billion (loc. cit), but there is no evidence on the 
fiscal revenue accruing to host or home countries from this activity.  
 
On the tax paid or payable on portfolio holdings of debt and equity there is little 
statistical evidence either. The general practice in the region is not to tax interest 
payments, dividends or capital gains to non-residents on the grounds that this merely 
increases the cost of borrowing above the going rate of return set in international 
capital markets plus the country risk premium.    This follows the precedent set by the 
US in absolving withholding tax on foreign residents earning interest income on 
portfolio investments in 1984 (OECD, 1998).  Non-residents investing on the US 
stock market face no capital gains tax, although they pay US tax on dividends 
accruing.  
 
The US decision subsequently forced all other industrialised countries to follow suit.  
While industrialised countries may be able to tax their residents’ overseas capital 
gains, the tax infrastructure of many developing countries prevents this. However, the 
US Subscribers to the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters in 1988, and thus information on such holding is shared 
with other OECD governments – but not non-members.  In the case of the large 
international portfolio holdings of residents of Latin America and the Caribbean, there QEH Working Paper – QEHWPS79    Page 10 
 




The focus of empirical research, therefore, has been on the taxation of income earned 
by foreign affiliates, and in particular those of US firms because the Department of 
Commerce publishes uniquely detailed data. Appendix A summarises these figures to 
show how effective tax rates vary between regions, countries and over time. We may 
assume that these figures are representative of all foreign affiliates. Table A.1 appears 
to indicate that the effective tax rate paid in the Latin America and Caribbean region 
as a whole is well below that for any other region of the world. However, as Table 
A.2 shows, this is almost entirely due to the effect of the ‘low-tax’ countries in the 
Caribbean, South and Central America having rates similar to those in Europe 
although lower than Asia. Moreover, as Table A.3 demonstrates, there has been a 
general downward trend in tax burdens in the major economies of the region – the 
average for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela declining from 50 percent in 
1983-6 to 25 percent in 1993-7. Finally, as Table A.4 illustrates, just two Caribbean 
jurisdictions (Bermuda and the British West Indies) are reported as the location of 
more gross income that the five major economies of the continent. In sum, the 
problem is one of the ‘location’ of corporate income as much as the tax rate itself or 
the location of production as such.  
 
Conover and Nichols (2000) confirm earlier findings that US firms do engage in 
income shifting worldwide on a large scale, although they did respond to the 1986 
Tax Reform Act by bringing income back to the US. The same is true of European 
OECD member firms; where extensive transfer pricing and tax-induced capital 
restructuring (e.g. intra-firm debt) take place despite the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines which call for the application 
of market prices to intra-firm transactions (Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2000). Work on 
US data by Artschuler and others (1998) supports this view, indicating that the 
elasticity of US manufacturing investment abroad to host tax rates is greater than 
unity and rose between the 1980s and 1990s.
6    
 
As we have seen, developed countries tend to adopt the residence principle, since they 
usually have a net positive foreign asset position and the residence principle 
maximises their tax take. Developing countries typically favour the source principle 
because they host significant amounts of FDI; although a number of emerging 
markets such as Mexico and Argentina have moved from source to residence taxation 
in an attempt to stimulate foreign investment and capture income from their residents' 
overseas assets.  
 
The problem for developing countries is exacerbated by the fact that the major 
industrialised countries follow worldwide income taxation systems that depart from 
                                                 
5 The detailed statistics published by the US Treasury on foreign holdings of US financial assets 
(principally bank deposits and government bonds) are not helpful here: first, because it included the 
operating balances of banks in the region, including central bank reserves; and second, because much 
of the assets are held via offshore accounts.  
6 Specifically, they estimate that the elasticity has risen from (minus) 2 to 3 between 1984 and 1992. 
Interestingly, this figure is very similar to the value for the corresponding elasticity ( -1/1-â ) between 
the capital stock (K) and the tax rate (t) that the model in Appendix B predicts for plausible parameter 
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pure residence or source principles. The US, for instance, taxes both foreign income 
of US residents and US-source income of non-residents. Moreover, it does not 
generally admit full foreign tax credits against US tax liabilities. This all-inclusive 
system tends to discourage outbound investment because it departs from the ‘capital 
export neutrality’ principle – that is, the tax rate varies according to the country of 
destination. Furthermore, the US currently applies different rules to foreign income 
taxation by US residents depending on whether operations are carried out directly by 
US persons (e.g. through a foreign branch) or indirectly, through a foreign 
corporation.  
 
In the former case, foreign income is currently taxed in the US. In the latter, foreign 
income is only taxed upon distribution to US persons. This implies that by choosing 
the corporate form in their foreign operations, US investors can defer US taxation and 
exploit cross-country tax differentials, at least in the short-run. Moreover, in order to 
regulate foreign tax credit availability and related issues (such as deferral of US 
taxation of foreign income), the system has evolved into a very complex set of rules 
that discourages capital mobility and encourages the use of tax havens to conduct 
foreign investment. 
 
OECD (2001) is the most authoritative recent study of the problem of tax incentives 
for FDI, from the point of view of OECD member and non-member governments. 
Corporate income tax is shown to play an important ‘backstopping’ role in enforcing 
capital gains tax on equity holders; and has a withholding function too for foreign 
firms. It is also justified as a user fee for public goods and services; and for local 
government share in economic rents. The OECD cautions about use of tax incentives 
for FDI, especially up-front measures such as tax holidays that promote tax avoidance 
measures; and also highlights the dangers of excessive reward to existing capital stock 
as opposed to net new investment. Much of desired reallocation effect can be gained 
by redesign of tax structure rather than blanket reductions.  
 
The type of multinational company most likely to be swayed in its location decision 
by levels of taxation will be those multinationals driven by short-term cost-
minimisation, and tending to emphasise low value-added production. Long-term 
profit-maximising multinationals are more concerned with ensuring flexibility of their 
international production structures, and hence with other location factors such as 
labour quality, currency stability, market access and natural resource availability. Tax 
breaks are viewed as a ‘windfall’ gain that is considered (and claimed) only after 
more relevant criteria have been satisfied.  Moreover, although the justification for tax 
incentives may be the desire to generate technological externalities, in practice the 
ability of a developing economy to realise these gains depends upon the prior 
existence of sufficient enterprise capability and a skilled workforce – and thus in all 
probability fairly high taxes (Blomstrom, 2001).  
 
A further problem associated with this issue is that of offshore financial centres. By 
allowing multinationals, through transfer pricing, to declare the majority of their 
profits in shell companies registered in OFCs, the tax revenues resulting from 
investment and production in (non-OFC) developing countries are lost to the hosts.
7  
                                                 
7 A particularly contentious case is the use of Foreign Sales Corporations to reduce tax burden for US 
exporters, but as these are mainly through the US Virgin Islands they lie beyond the scope of this 
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The Financial Stability Forum (FSF, 2000) addressed the issue of Offshore Centres 
(OFCs) from the point of view of systemic instability in international capital markets. 
Those OFCs unable or unwilling to adhere to international supervisory standards 
(weak supervisory practices and/or no cooperation and transparency) pose two serious 
problems: (i) prudential concerns for the effective supervision of international 
financial intermediaries; and (ii) market integrity concerns relating to the 




Finally, foreign portfolio investment has recently become subject to a variety of 
taxation measures intended to act as capital controls on inflows or outflows in a 
number of emerging markets. Although this paper addresses the direct taxation of 
income from foreign assets rather than indirect (i.e. turnover) taxes on asset 
transactions
9, it should be observed that withholding taxes on asset income can have a 
similar dampening effect as although the base is smaller the rate is much higher (Zee, 
2000). Such a tax can be designed to provide an incentive to foreign investors holding 
assets of longer maturities, or to hold any asset for a longer period, of course. 
Moreover, a withholding tax of this kind would bear on the many resident holders of 
domestic securities (particularly high yield government bonds) who do so via offshore 






5. New Policy Issues for Latin America and the Caribbean  
From the point of view of developing country revenue authorities, DTTs are at present 
the only reliable way to cover intra-firm transactions and thus overcome the problem 
of transfer pricing (OECD, 1998). It is thus necessary to ensure far more 
comprehensive information exchange within existing treaties than is currently the case 
– particularly in relation to assets in the US. Such measures, however, become 
ineffective if offshore centres are used as transfer pricing points as well as for tax 
avoidance.  In consequence, absent a comprehensive multilateral tax agreement, 
reconsideration of tax credits within existing DTTs would be desirable; as would the 
application of the US ‘pass-through’ principle to tax havens.  
 
Either the source or the residence principle could provide a basis for an effective 
system of international tax co-operation, if it were applied uniformly.  Tanzi (1996a, 
b, 1998) thus argues that the time has come for some sort of world tax organisation; 
but not to impose/collect taxes (politically infeasible) but rather to support national 
authorities. Such an organisation would (a) exercise surveillance on tax systems 
worldwide; (b) provide a policy forum; (c) resolve disputes on tax competition; (d) 
                                                 
8 The FATF published a report (‘Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories.’) listing 15 jurisdictions 
which failed to meet international anti-money laundering standards: including the Bahamas, Cayman 
Islands, St. Kitts & Nevis, St Vincent & Grenadines, Dominica and Panama as well as Israel, Lebanon, 
Liechtenstein, Philippines and Russia. However, in 19 June 2000 the OECD announced that six 
jurisdictions, including Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, had made commitments to eliminate harmful 
tax practices by the end of 2005, embracing international tax standards for transparency, exchange of 
information and fair tax competition.  
9 But see FitzGerald (1999) for an extensive discussion of this topic.  QEH Working Paper – QEHWPS79    Page 13 
 
exercise moral pressure on free riders; (e) gather tax statistics; (f) communicate best 
practice; (g) develop codes of conduct in tax administration.   
 
However, it is difficult to see how such a solution could be implemented in practice. 
The United States is unlikely to change its own tax system simply to increase the tax 
take of other countries. Prospects for reform are somewhat greater in the EU as a 
result of current efforts to harmonise corporate tax rules within the single market and 
the emerging agreement on the prevention of tax competition and tax evasion between 
member states. The concern of OECD members to coordinate measures against tax 
evasion, avoidance and competition between themselves – and the resultant pressure 
on offshore centres – indicates their degree of concern for their own tax bases. To 
extend such cooperative measures towards middle-income non-OECD measures 
(many of whom already have observer status at the OECD) would be a logical and 
technically feasible step.    
 
Information provision alone by industrialised country tax authorities would improve 
the situation. Since the information is collected in any case, in order to levy dividend 
taxes, the ultimate cost might not be overwhelming. This option would require 
confidence in the administrative capacity, independence and discretion of the tax 
authorities of even leading Latin American countries. In a transitional period, an 
alternative might be for taxes to be levied at source and simply transferred to the 
authorities of the country of residence. At the very least the principles of information 
exchange could be established within the framework of the FTAA as a counterpart to 
the property rights established under the proposed investment provisions.  
 
The European Community proposal for the taxation of cross-border interest payments, 
the ‘withholding tax directive’ shows that a measure of this nature is feasible (EC, 
1998). Even opponents agree that in principle withholding taxes are justifiable 
because they are neutral for investors properly declaring their tax liability elsewhere, 
but unless universally applied would simply lead to the shifting of the formal location 
of income payments. Progress in the European proposals – albeit in the form of 
information exchange on payments – would provide a precedent for Latin America 
and the Caribbean. In this context, Zee (2000) argues for a withholding tax on all 
private capital inflows into emerging markets, with a credit and refund provision that 
that operates within the administrative framework of the existing domestic tax system 
and which would be substantially more difficult to evade than reserve requirements.   
 
As mentioned above, a prospect for reforming tax administration may be provided by 
the drive for better co-ordination among national tax authorities to tackle organised 
crime and money laundering. Both banks and regulators have come under strong 
pressure to share information on financial transactions as part of this crime-fighting 
effort and, in the process, divulge the overseas assets of residents in a particular tax 
jurisdiction.  This would seem to imply a need for greater sharing of technical 
expertise as well as information as such within the region. 
 
The existence of a regional tax cooperation arrangement (such as the EU) allows for 
gains from coordination within the region permitting both greater revenues and 
greater inward investment, without global coordination (Haufler and Wooton, 2001).  
Indeed in recent years as investment incentives in industrialising countries have 
tended to move towards the ‘regulatory domain’ in terms of market access, QEH Working Paper – QEHWPS79    Page 14 
 
environmental protection and labour standards, these too have required greater 
cooperation in order to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ (FitzGerald, 2001).  Further, a 
regional arrangement that makes national rates more predictable will have a positive 
effect because uncertainty about future rates of return can have a disproportionate 
impact on investment decisions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).    
 
Information exchange thus central to tax cooperation, although it should be 
remembered that the scope and usefulness of exchanges of information are limited by 
political, legal, technical and administrative obstacles (Tanzi and Zee, 1999).  In 
general, withholding taxes may be the only solution to the revenue problem: “It is 
unlikely that an efficient and complete system of exchange of information can be 
developed. This leaves the alternative of using withholding taxes applied at source as 
final taxes” (Tanzi, 1998 p. 21).  Specifically, in order to tackle the income-shifting 
problem, a presumptive tax could be levied on corporations on the basis of their gross 
assets rather than reported profits (Sadka and Tanzi, 1992). 
 
In sum, pressure for effective international cooperation to facilitate income tax 
collection is increasing.  The increasing mobility of capital across national borders 
poses serious problems for national fiscal authorities committed to taxing income 
from wealth. Co-operation between tax officials could reduce some of these problems, 
but jurisdictional disputes and bank secrecy laws have blocked progress. However, 
advances in tax cooperation between OECD members – particularly EU members – 
provide not only a precedent for a regional arrangement but also the basis for 
requiring cooperation from developed countries. For Latin American and Caribbean 
countries such an arrangement would also allow much greater capture of tax revenue 
on the capital income of their own residents, not only of undeclared assets overseas 
but also of domestic assets by reducing the fiscal attraction of expatriating capital or 
ownership.  Closer international collaboration within The Americas within the 
existing tax treaty network by sharing information and permitting joint actions could 
increase the fiscal resources available to the region. Further benefits would stem from 
this, including disincentives to capital flight, increased fiscal and macroeconomic 
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Appendix A    Statistics on Income Tax Paid by US Affiliates 
 
 






















2115  1937  41  137  23%  112 
             
of which:             
Canada  248  233  5  10  33%  7 
Europe  1208  1102  22  84  21%  73 
LAC  245  218  5  23  17%  14 
Africa  22  19  1  2  38%  1 
Middle 
East 
10  8  1  1  50%  14 
Asia -
Pacific 
378  358  8  17  32%  3 
*Foreign Income Tax /Gross Income; Gross Income = Net Income + Foreign Income 
Tax 






























All LAC  245.1  217.8  4.6  22.7  17%  14.4 
             
South 
America 
127.0  120.7  1.8  4.5  25%  11.7 
Central 
America 
77.0  69.5  1.9  5.7  25%  2.3 
Caribbean  41.3  27.7  1.0  12.5  7%  0.4 
Source: as above 
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Table A.3  Income and Taxation of US Affiliates in selected LAC countries*, 1998 
 


















All LAC  245.1  217.8  4.6  22.7  17%  14.4 
             
Argentina  21.4  20.5  0.4  0.4  50%  2.6 
Brazil  67.0  63.2  0.6  3.2  16%  7.2 
Chile  10.1  9.1  0.2  0.8  20%  0.5 
Mexico  67.5  61.6  1.7  4.1  29%  1.8 
Venezuela  10.3  10.2  0.2  -  ..  0.5 
             
Bermuda  18.0  11.3  0.3  6.5  4%  - 
BWI  11.7  7.6  0.2  3.9  3%  - 
* Those reporting over US$ 10 bn in income by the subsidiaries 








Table A.4 Reported Average Income Tax Burdens in Selected Countries, 1983-97 
Foreign Income Tax/Gross Income (%)  1983-86  1988-91  1993-97 
Argentina  24  27  30 
Brazil   48  49  21 
Chile  54  11  21 
Mexico  71  36  31 
Venezuela  54  44  23 
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Appendix B      A Simple Model of Capital Income Tax in the Open Economy 
 
This note sets out to illustrate the optimal capital income tax problem for an economy 
with an open capital market and two types of capital, one of which is private, mobile 
and ‘directly productive (i.e. generates profits) while the other is public, immobile and 
‘indirectly productive’ (i.e. infrastructure). The problem is how to set a level of tax so 
as to fund infrastructure and maximise welfare when capital can move abroad.    
 
Consider an economy with three production factors, immobile labour (L), mobile 
capital (K), and tax-financed infrastructure (J). National income (Y) is determined by 
 
g b a J K L A Y . =               (1) 
 
The usual conditions obtain, determining the return on capital (r) as  
 








=             (2) 
 
The labour force and the infrastructure stock are given for any one period, but the 
capital stock is flexible as capital can flow inwards or outwards, depending upon the 
post-tax rate of return. We could also include an appropriate risk premium, but if 
constant it would not affect the results. For a given domestic tax rate (t) and the 
exogenous international rates of tax (t*) and of return (r*), capital will flow in so long 
as the post-tax rates of return are attractive: that is, if  *) 1 ( * ) 1 ( t r t r - ‡ - . We ignore 
here the effect of double-taxation agreements, which effectively reduce t not only for 
the host country but also for others with which the home country has similar treaties. 
At equilibrium, then    
 
*) 1 ( * ) 1 ( t r t r - = -                 (3) 
 
and substituting (3) into (2) yields the equilibrium capital stock  
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) 1 ( .
t r
t J L
K             (4) 
 
Note that this will give an elasticity of the capital stock to the tax rate that is negative 
and greater than unity. Substituting (4) into (1) then gives national income (Y) in 




























J AL Y           (5) 
 
From (4) it apparently follows that any increase in the domestic corporation tax rate 
(t) will reduce national income (Y).  The optimal rate is zero, or even negative 
(subsidies) if these can be financed. This is the basis for the traditional argument for 
reducing corporation tax rates in developing countries in order to stimulate investment QEH Working Paper – QEHWPS79    Page 21 
 
and growth.  In addition, it seems clear that if the international tax rate (t*) in general 
– or that of competitors for inward investment in particular - is reduced, then in order 
to maintain national income levels, it will be necessary to reduce t as well. 
International tax competition is thus held to be conducive to welfare maximisation.  
 
However, for this conclusion to hold, it is necessary to assume that not only the labour 
force (L) but also the infrastructure provided (J) is independent of the tax rate.  In this 
model the infrastructure stock (J) is given the previous years’ stock less depreciation 
(d) plus the new investment funded by revenue from the tax on profits (K.r) 
 
r K t d J J . . ) 1 ( 1 + - = -              (6) 
 
In order to simplify the algebra, we shall only consider the second term on the RHS of 
(5) because the first term is unaffected by the current tax rate. In this case we can 
rewrite (1) by substituting in the truncated (6) to yield 
 
{ }
g b g a + = K tr L A Y .               (7) 
 
Substituting in (2) and (3) as before then yields a new expression for national income 
 
{ } [ ] g b b g b b a b - - - - - = 1
1
) 1 ( *) 1 ( * . . t t t r L a Y          (8) 
 
Y is no longer monotonically and inversely related to t in (8) as it was in (5), because 
a tax increase no longer just reduces the private capital stock (K) but also raises the 
public stock (J). Under the usual conditions there is an optimum positive value (T) 





= T                  (9) 
 
The optimal tax rate is thus positive and depends on the relative marginal 
productivities of the two forms of capital stock (K, J). Indeed, if the tax rate is set to 
zero, then national income will also be zero as there will be no infrastructure. By 
extension, in poor countries where infrastructure J is scarce and its marginal 
productivity is higher (while the marginal productivity of mobile capital K is 
equalised worldwide) corporate tax rates should be higher than in advanced countries.   
 
From (8) it is also clear that the resulting level of national income still depends on the 
international tax rate (r*) even after the optimal domestic tax rate has been applied. If 
the international rate is lowered by ‘home’ (i.e. investor) countries – or by competing 
host countries – then national income in the host country will fall as less mobile 
capital is attracted. However, even under these circumstances (t* falling), to engage in 
a ‘race to the bottom’ (i.e. set t below T) would reduce host national income even 
more.  